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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2016–2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners 
reviews Florida appellate court decisions involving state tax and other 
business law matters.
1
  While the cases that have been included are mostly 
from 2016 through June of 2017, several important 2015 cases have been 
included.
2
 
Part II provides analysis of appellate cases where the courts were 
presented with disputes by and among the business, its owners and their 
transferees, and its key employees, whether sounding in tort, contract, 
statutory law, or a combination thereof.
3
 
Part III considers litigation with third parties starting with several 
important state tax cases involving constitutional and procedural issues of 
note.
4
  Cases arising in and out of the ordinary course of business, again, 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation 
and Master of Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and 
Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York 
Law School; LL.M. (Tax), New York University School of Law. 
1. See infra Parts I–II. 
2. See infra Parts II–III. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
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whether sounding in tort, contract, or statutory law—other than tax—or a 
combination follow.
5
 
II. CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND 
PARTNERSHIPS:  DIVORCES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER 
A. Officers and Directors Liability 
1. Director and Officer Liability Policy:  Insured Versus Insured 
Exclusion 
Mr. Durant, a shareholder of Bonifay Holding Company, Inc. 
(“Corporation”), was formerly a director of Corporation.6  Mr. James, at all 
times relevant to this case, was Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and 
President of Corporation.
7
  Mr. Durant previously sold his stock back to 
Corporation
8
 but later repurchased the stock.
9
  After the repurchase, Mr. 
Durant brought and prevailed in an action against Mr. James, which alleged 
overvaluation of the repurchased stock.
10
  Mr. Durant attempted to collect the 
money judgment awarded in that action—of more than $1 million—by 
seeking a writ of garnishment against the directors and officers under a 
policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Insurance 
Company”), which insured the Corporation’s directors and officers.11  
Insurance Company counterclaimed and sought a declaration that the claim 
was not covered by the policy.
12
  The policy contained an insured versus 
insured coverage exclusion (“Exclusion”), whereby Insurance Company was 
not required to pay claims by one [i]nsured [p]erson against another 
[i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct,
13
 subject to two exceptions set forth 
in the policy.
14
  The Exclusion did not apply to claims based upon an 
insured’s employment or for contribution or indemnification of otherwise 
covered claims.
15
  Mr. Durant argued that his suit against Mr. James was not 
undertaken “as a director or [as a] former . . . director, . . . but [rather] in his 
                                                          
5. See id. 
6. Durant v. James, 189 So. 3d 993, 995 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  Mr. Durant was required by the judgment of dissolution entered in his 
divorce to sell his stock in Corporation.  Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 995 & n.1. 
15. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995 n.1. 
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[individual] capacity,” and the writ sought was based on damages awarded to 
him under a “judgment unrelated to his former director position.”16  Both 
Insurance Company and Mr. Durant filed motions seeking summary 
declaratory judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment to Insurance 
Company and Mr. Durant appealed.
17
  The Exclusion provided that “[t]he 
insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for [l]oss in connection with 
any [c]laim by or at the behest of the Company, or any affiliate of the 
Company or any [i]nsured [p]erson”—the balance of the provision being the 
two exceptions mentioned above.
18
  Insured persons were defined in the 
policy as “any past, present or future director, trustee, officer . . . of the 
Company,” and the definition of claim contained in the policy was “any 
demand ‘against an [i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct;’” there was no 
disagreement as to these definitions.
19
  The district court, noting that the fact 
that Mr. Durant and Mr. James were both insured persons was not contested, 
concluded that Mr. Durant failed to bring himself within the policy’s express 
exceptions to the Exclusion, nor was he acting in furtherance of some 
statutory duty.
20
  The First District Court of Appeal in Durant v. James
21
 
considered the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s22 and concluded that Rigby was distinguishable from 
the case before the First District Court of Appeal.
23
  Rigby involved a trustee 
in bankruptcy added to a previously issued director and officer liability 
policy as an insured person, and specifically named in the amended 
definition of the term director in the policy.
24
  The Third District Court of 
Appeal in Rigby held that the Exclusion did not apply to the trustee in 
bankruptcy acting in furtherance of statutory duties of the trustee under 
federal bankruptcy statutes and suing other directors—on behalf of 
creditors.
25
  The Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby held that the 
bankruptcy trustee “did not bring the adversary action acting as an officer or 
                                                          
16. Id. at 995. 
17. Id. at 994–95. 
18. Id. at 995 n.1. 
19. Id. at 995. 
20. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96.  The First District Court of Appeal 
distinguished the facts before it from the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s—involving a trustee in bankruptcy acting in furtherance of 
the duties of the trustee under federal bankruptcy statutes.  Id.; see also Rigby v. Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, 907 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
21. 189 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
22. 907 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
23. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995. 
24. Id.; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1188–89.  As discussed in Durant, there was an 
amendment to the definition of director in the policy involved in Rigby to include, by name, 
the bankruptcy trustee.  Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
25. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
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director.  As a result, the insured versus insured [provision] did not apply.”26  
After distinguishing Rigby, the First District Court of Appeal in Durant 
noted that it was “further persuaded by the opinions of other jurisdictions, 
holding that the capacity in which the claimant sued the other officer or 
director in the first instance had no bearing on the bar on coverage under a 
[directors and officers] policy’s insured versus insured exclusion.”27  The 
First District Court of Appeal concluded that the policy did not contain any 
ambiguity and there was no “lack of clarity in the terms” requiring 
interpretation.
28
 
2. Who Is on the Board and Where Did the Corporation Go? 
The dispute in Wilson v. Wilson
29
 stemmed from the death of 
Reverend John Wilson (“Reverend”).30  The Reverend had incorporated a 
number of entities.
31
  The initial issue in the trial court was regarding the 
identities of the members of the boards of directors of those corporations 
(“Corporations”).32  Before trial, the judge allowed the former personal 
representative of the Reverend’s estate (“Intervenor”) to intervene.33  The 
Intervenor’s position was that the various Corporations formed by the 
Reverend had not operated as not-for-profit corporations, and therefore, the 
Corporations’ assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to 
administration.
34
  As to the initial issue—the identity of the board 
members—the trial judge’s order stated that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendants had proven that they were board members.
35
  The trial judge also 
ruled, in essence, that the Corporations were to be disregarded and that the 
assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to administration, 
which supported the Intervenor’s position.36  On appeal, the Third District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendants were not 
directors, but reversed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs were not 
directors.
37
  The appellate court noted that the Corporations’ regularly filed 
required annual reports identified the plaintiffs as members of the Board of 
                                                          
26. Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
27. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 996. 
28. Id. 
29. 211 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
30. Id. at 314. 
31. Id. at 317. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 315. 
34. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 315. 
35. Id. at 316. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 319–20. 
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Directors.
38
  The district court also reversed the trial court’s ruling that 
effectively dissolved the Corporations—and went even further by deciding to 
whom the dissolved Corporations’ assets belonged.39  Also, under the test set 
out by the Supreme Court of Florida in Morgareidge v. Howey,
40
 the 
Intervenor should not have been allowed to intervene as he had no interest of 
the direct and immediate character required.
41
  Nor should the Intervenor 
have been permitted to introduce new issues of validity of the Corporations 
and of the ownership of the assets of the Corporations, as intervenors are not 
allowed to introduce new issues.
42
 
3. Fiduciary Duties 
The next case, Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.,
43
 is a consolidated 
appeal of two Miami-Dade County Circuit Court cases.
44
  In Taverna 
Imports, Inc. v. Maricela Fonseca (“Case One”), the allegations included the 
following:  Taverna Imports, Inc. (“Corporation”) issued 4500 of its 5000 
authorized shares equally to three shareholders—Mario Taverna (“Mario”), 
Maricela Fonseca (“Maricela”), and Jule Laudisio (“Jule”)—when 
Corporation was formed in 2002.
45
  Corporation, in 2005, redeemed 1000 
shares from Jule,
46
 and at the end of January 2007, Jule agreed, in writing, to 
have her remaining 500 shares redeemed for cash—with checks for the 
correct amounts transmitted to her at the end of January of 2007.
47
  This left 
Mario and Maricela as the remaining shareholders.
48
  Within three days after 
receipt of the checks, Jule attempted to disavow the sale of her remaining 
shares and she returned the checks to Corporation.
49
  In late February 2007, 
at a formal shareholders’ meeting, Mario, the elected president of 
Corporation, was purportedly ousted from that role by a vote of the 
shareholders, including Jule, which ouster occurred even though the 
                                                          
38. Id. at 319. 
39. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 317–18, 320. 
40. 78 So. 14 (Fla. 1918). 
41. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 316–17 (quoting Morgareidge, 78 So. at 15). 
42. Id. 
43. 212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
44. Id. at 434. 
45. Id. at 434–35. 
46. Id. at 435.  After the 2005 redemption, 45% of the shares were owned by 
Mario, 45% of the shares were owned by Maricela, and 10% of the shares were owned by 
Jule.  Id. 
47. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 435. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
6
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corporate by-laws required that officers be removed by the Board of 
Directors.
50
 
Mario and Corporation sued:  (1) Maricela; (2) Richard Fonseca 
(“Richard”), Maricela’s husband; (3) Jule; and (4) Hans Eichmann (“Hans”), 
a former member of the Board of Directors of Corporation, and an employee 
and a former employee of Corporation.
51
  In the lawsuit, Corporation 
requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the redemption of Jule’s 
stock was valid and that the corporate actions taken after Jule’s stock had 
been repurchased were invalid.
52
  Mario also sought damages for Maricela’s 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty and for Richard’s alleged aiding and 
abetting of Maricela’s alleged breach.53  On Corporation’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, the trial court found that the redemption of Jule’s shares 
was valid, that the election of a new president at the formal shareholders’ 
meeting was not valid, and that Mario was still president of Corporation.
54
  
After trial, on the remaining issues, the jury awarded damages of $1,063,234 
in favor of Corporation against all of the defendants for “wrongfully [taking] 
corporate authority of [the Corporation], which caused [it] damages.”55  The 
jury also awarded damages of $833,000 to Mario, individually, for 
Maricela’s breach of fiduciary duty and Richard’s role in aiding and 
abetting.
56
  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court 
proceedings except as to the calculation of damages.
57
  The redemption of 
Jule’s shares to Corporation was valid even though only Jule signed the 
agreement, and not Corporation, since the parties had performed under the 
contract.
58
  The fact that Jule did not cash the checks was of no legal 
consequence.
59
  Mario’s removal as president was ineffective as it was not 
done “by a majority vote of the Board of Directors.”60  The district court also 
held that there was competent substantial evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict that Maricela breached her fiduciary duty to Mario under section 
                                                          
50. Id. at 435–36.  About a month later, after a special meeting, Mario found 
himself locked out of the Corporation’s warehouse, although he was subsequently let in, at 
which time he discovered that Hans, the former employee and former board member, was 
back and managing the business.  Id.  Mario was eventually terminated.  Fonseca, 212 So. 3d 
at 436. 
51. Id. at 434 & n.3, 437. 
52. Id. at 437. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 435, 437. 
55. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 438. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 443. 
58. Id. at 440–41. 
59. See id. at 441. 
60. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 441–42. 
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607.0831 of the Florida Statutes.
61
  In addition, the court found competent 
substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict that Maricela’s husband, 
Richard, aided and abetted Maricela in breaching her fiduciary duty owed to 
Mario, with the Third District Court of Appeal holding that “Florida law 
recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary 
duty.”62 
Richard Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.
63 (“Case Two”) involved 
Richard’s purchase of Bank of America’s judgments, one against 
Corporation and one against Mario, but only the judgment for $110,309.36 
against Corporation was before the appellate court.
64
  The trial judge, in Case 
Two, granted Richard’s motion and allowed him to proceed as to the 
purchased judgment against the Corporation—by levying and executing 
against the 1000 shares redeemed by the Corporation from Jule in 2005.
65
  
By allowing seizure of Jule’s formerly owned shares, Maricela, by way of 
Richard, would own a majority interest in Corporation giving Maricela the 
power to cancel Corporation’s judgments, the only remaining significant 
assets of Corporation, against Maricela and Richard.
66
  The Third District 
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under the unique circumstances of 
this case “[t]he trial court . . . should have applied Richard[’s monetary] 
judgment” against Corporation as an offset to Corporation’s judgments 
against Maricela and Richard in Case One.
67
  Otherwise, control of 
Corporation would be obtained for an improper purpose.
68
 
4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference:  Default/The 
Ultimate Sanction 
In 2010, Mr. Coghlan and Ms. Del Grosso (“Individual 
Plaintiffs”)—while employees, officers, directors, and shareholders of The 
Bare Board Group, Inc. (“Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation”)—
allegedly lent money to Mr. Doyle, a person who, like Individual Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, was “in the printed computer 
                                                          
61. Id. at 442; see also FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2016). 
62. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442. 
63. 212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
64. Id. at 434, 439 n.8, 445. 
65. Id. at 439 n.6.  The district court noted that levy and execution was sought 
only on the shares redeemed from Jule “given [Richard’s] position throughout the litigation 
(and here on appeal) that Jule” still owned shares.  Id. 
66. Id. at 445–46. 
67. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 434, 445–46. 
68. Id. at 447 (citing Rowland v. Times Publ’g Co., 35 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla. 
1948)). 
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circuit board industry.”69  Individual Plaintiffs allegedly knew Mr. Doyle 
planned to establish a printed circuit board company, which he did in 2010, 
incorporating as ICMfg & Associates, Inc. (“Plaintiff Corporation”).70  
Individual Plaintiffs resigned from their officer and director positions with 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation on January 13, 2012.
71
  Individual 
Plaintiffs had also been highly compensated employees of Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation, but they resigned from their employment on 
the same day that they resigned as officers and directors.
72
  They remained 
shareholders of Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, but Individual 
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation
73
 brought a declaratory judgment action 
against Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation to determine the proper 
value of Individual Plaintiffs’ shares held in Defendant Counterclaimant 
Corporation.
74
  They also sought a determination by the court because “they 
were in doubt about their rights under the shareholder agreement.”75  
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation answered the complaint, alleged 
various affirmative defenses and, in an amended counterclaim, alleged the 
following as to Individual Plaintiffs:  (1) [B]reach of fiduciary duty, (2) civil 
conspiracy to defraud, (3) fraud, (4) “violation of the Florida Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act” (“FDUTPA”),76 and (5) “tortious interference 
with business relationships;” and as to Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle, 
alleged the following:  (1) “[A]iding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,” 
(2) civil conspiracy to defraud, (3) violation of FDUTPA, and (4) “tortious 
interference with [Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s] business 
relationships.”77  The counterclaim was answered and contained affirmative 
defenses.
78
  The trial court found that in the course of the litigation, 
Individual Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) 
had committed what amounted to fraud upon the court, and on Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s motion to impose sanctions, the trial court 
                                                          
69. ICMfg & Assocs. v. Bare Bd. Grp., No. 2D15-3557, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2017). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Id. at 2–3. 
73. See id. at 3.  Why Plaintiff Corporation was a plaintiff in the original 
declaratory judgment action is not apparent from the appellate court decision.*  However, 
Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle were counter-defendants as to Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaims.  ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 3. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  The appellate court noted that the shareholder agreement gave 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation “the first right of redemption” of Individual 
Plaintiffs’ shares in the event their employment ended.  Id. 
76. Id. at 3–5; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2011). 
77. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 5. 
78. Id. 
9
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struck the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.79  This left the Plaintiffs in the position of 
having defaulted on Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaim 
so that Defendant Counterclaimant did not need to establish liability on the 
part of the Plaintiffs.
80
  The Plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the 
default, Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation was still required to prove a 
causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ conduct and Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.81  The trial judge disagreed, 
ruling that the default had established the element of causation as to all of the 
Plaintiffs.
82
  The jury awarded substantial damages—totaling almost $10 
million—to Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation based on expert 
testimony, although the expert did not consider the issue of causation.
83
  The 
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the 
sanction striking Plaintiffs’ pleadings.84  The conduct of the Plaintiffs 
justified the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this fashion and the 
imposition of the sanction.
85
  However, when it came to the issue of 
damages, the district court did not approve of the pre-trial ruling that the 
default on the question of liability was enough to establish the nexus and 
causation between the Plaintiffs’ tortious acts and Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.86  The damages were 
unliquidated and the Plaintiffs had the right to contest “the causal 
relationship between the damages claimed and the liability established by the 
default.”87  The district court reversed on the award of damages for lost 
profits and prejudgment interest and remanded for trial on only the issue of 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.88 
B. Claims of Shareholders, Members, and Partners 
1. Statutory Appraisal Right:  Valuation of Corporate Stock 
The issue on appeal in this case was the proper fair market valuation 
of shares of a corporation (“Corporation”) that was to be merged with 
                                                          
79. Id. at 6–7. 
80. Id. at 7. 
81. Id. at 7–8. 
82. See ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 8. 
83. Id. at 9–10, 12. 
84. Id. at 22. 
85. See id. at 13. 
86. Id. at 18. 
87. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 16 (quoting Talucci v. Matthews, 960 So. 2d 
9, 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam)). 
88. Id. at 22. 
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another corporation.
89
  Corporation estimated the value of the dissenting 
shareholder’s (“Dissenting Shareholder”) 25% interest at $420 per share, 
while Dissenting Shareholder’s proposed estimate was $5,066.67 per share, 
which would translate into a value for her interest in the corporation of $1.9 
million.
90
  At trial, two expert witnesses testified as to the value of 
Dissenting Shareholder’s stock, one on behalf of Corporation and one on 
behalf of Dissenting Shareholder, but the judge adopted the opinion of 
neither.
91
  Instead, the trial judge found that the fair market value of the 
shares was $1.9 million, the same amount claimed by the Dissenting 
Shareholder—which was more than her trial expert witness’s valuation.92  
Dissenting Shareholder based her fair market value estimate “on an 
independent accountant’s valuation,” but no documentation of this valuation 
was produced at trial.
93
  The judge entered an order using the $1.9 million 
amount and Corporation appealed.
94
  On appeal, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal stated that the trial court has discretion to:  (1) appoint independent 
appraisers to make a recommendation as to the fair market value,
95
 which the 
trial judge did not do; (2) has discretion to accept one party’s expert’s 
opinions, or even portions of more than one expert opinion,
96
 which the 
judge did not do; or (3) the trial judge may “formulate an independent 
valuation based on the evidence presented,” but the judge’s valuation must 
be supported by substantial competent evidence.
97
  The appellate court said 
the judge did not adopt the opinion of either appraiser, did not appoint an 
independent appraiser, and did not provide an explanation as to how the 
judge arrived at the $1.9 million fair market value.
98
  The Fifth District Court 
reversed and remanded with instructions.
99
 
89. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Sandhu, 207 So. 3d 981, 983 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam). 
90. Id.  Dissenting Shareholder was the former spouse of one of the individual 
defendants sued by Dissenting Shareholder.  Id.  The judgment dissolving their marriage 
granted each spouse a one-half interest in the individual defendant’s one-half interest, with the 
merger plan and appraisal proceeding being the outgrowth of the equitable distribution.  Id. 
91. Id. at 983–84. 
92. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 984. 
93. Id. at 985. 
94. Id. at 984. 
95. Id. at 985 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1330(4) (2013)). 
96. Id. at 986 n.7. 
97. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 986. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
11
Landau: 2016-2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
12 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
2. No Personal Liability for Repayment of Contribution to Limited 
Liability Corporation 
Georg Schollmeier (“Schollmeier”) agreed to a capital contribution 
of $400,000 in Avrupa, LLC (“LLC”) in exchange for a 20% interest in 
LLC.
100
  The members of LLC—Tulga Demir (“Demir”), Tugend Demir 
(“Tugend”), and Schollmeier—entered into an agreement entitled Avrupa, 
LLC Contribution Agreement (“Agreement”) that provided that, if 
Schollmeier decided to withdraw from LLC, he would be repaid his 
contribution.
101
  When Schollmeier requested repayment of his contribution, 
and it was not forthcoming, he sued Demir and Tugend and alleged that they 
breached their Agreement.
102
  On December 12, 2014, after hearing a motion 
for summary judgment,
103
 the trial court held Demir personally liable on 
Schollmeier’s breach of contract claim, and Demir appealed.104  The Third 
District Court said that “[t]he final judgment against Demir individually as it 
relates to Schollmeier’s financial contribution to Avrupa is based on the trial 
court’s determination that the Agreement . . . was not a limited liability 
company operating agreement, . . . but instead a personal contract solely 
governing the terms of Schollmeier’s contribution.”105  The Third District 
Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the agreement was tantamount to a 
limited liability company operating agreement.
106
  The Third District 
reversed and remanded,
107
 and cited to its decision in Dinuro Investments, 
LLC v. Camacho,
108
 stated that a principal reason for forming a limited 
                                                          
100. Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So. 3d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).  
LLC was formed by Tulga Demir to run a Miami Beach night club.  Id.  The club was open 
from early February of 2007 until March 29, 2007.  Id. at 444. 
101. Id. at 443–44. 
102. Id. at 444.  Schollmeier’s complaint contained counts that sought damages 
for alleged “breach of fiduciary duty, . . . breach of statutory duty of loyalty and care” and a 
count seeking an accounting, but there were proposals for settlement of these counts, and the 
proposals were later accepted by Schollmeier.  Demir, 199 So. 3d at 444. 
103. Id.  Schollmeier stated that he asked for only $375,000 of the amount on 
his motion for summary judgment because there was a dispute as to whether the other $25,000 
was actually contributed.  Id. at 444 n.2. 
104. Id. at 444. 
105. Id. at 445. 
106. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445.  Section 1 of the Agreement recited that it was 
“a limited liability company agreement under and as provided in the Act.”  Id.  The definition 
of Act in the Agreement was “the Limited Liability Company Act of the State of Florida.”  Id. 
at 444 n.1. 
107. Id. at 447. 
108. 141 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
12
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liability company is to obtain protection from personal liability.
109
  The 
court, quoting from Dinuro Investments, LLC stated that: 
Conspicuously missing from the operating agreement is any 
provision stating that the members shall be directly liable to each 
other for breaches of the terms of the operating agreement . . . .  
Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that 
members are typically shielded from individual liability for their 
involvement with an LLC unless the terms of the articles of 
organization or the operating agreement provide otherwise.
110
 
The court then quoted section 608.4227(1) of the 2011 Florida Statutes as 
additional support.
111
  That subsection provided that: 
 
Except as provided in this chapter, the members, managers, and 
managing members of a limited liability company are not liable, 
solely by reason of being a member or serving as a manager or 
managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, 
or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the 
limited liability company.
112
 
 
The Avrupa agreement “[did] not contain any provision or language 
indicating that any Member of Avrupa would be personally liable to any 
                                                          
109. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742). 
110. Id. at 446 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742). 
111. Id.  Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes was repealed effective June 
11, 2015.  Act Effective July 1, 2015, Ch. 2015-148, § 11, 2015 Fla. Laws 1, 9 (amending § 
608.4227, FLA. STAT. 2011).  Section 605.0304(1) of the Florida Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act provides as follows: 
A debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited liability 
company is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of 
the company.  A member or manager is not personally liable, 
directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, 
for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the company solely 
by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.  This 
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the 
company. 
Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Ch. 2013-180, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 2105, 
2142 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 605.0101–1108 (2013)).  The Savings Clause provisions are 
found in section 605.1106 of the Florida Statutes and its effective dates are under section 
605.1108 of the Florida Statutes.  Id. § 605.1106, 605.1108(4).  A limited liability company 
with the name Avrupa, LLC was “Admin Dissolution for Annual Report” on September 14, 
2007.  Detail by Entity Name:  Avrupa, LLC, SUNBIZ, 
http://search.sunbiz.org/inquiry/corporationsearch/Byname (search in search bar for “Avrupa, 
LLC”; then follow “Avrupa, LLC” hyperlink under “Entity Name List”) (last visited Dec. 31, 
2017). 
112. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 446. 
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other Member for the company’s obligations.”113  The court concluded that if 
it was the parties’ intent that there would be personal liability for the parties’ 
capital contributions, “the terms needed to be explicit.”114  Mr. Schollmeier 
could only look to the company for reimbursement.
115
 
3. Limited Partnerships and Corporations:  Derivative Actions 
Required 
In this dispute among siblings, one brother (“Plaintiff”) sued three 
brothers (“the Brothers”), over the siblings’ ownership interests in each of 
the siblings’ several business entities including two closely held corporations 
and two limited partnerships (“the Entities”).116  However, there was one 
entity, Biloxi 3, LLC, involved in the litigation that was owned by the 
Brothers, not Plaintiff.
117
  Plaintiff sought relief against the Brothers alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him with respect to actions taken by the 
Entities.
118
  The improper actions alleged were “unearned excessive bonuses 
and management fees paid by” one of the Entities to the Brothers, and the 
alleged improper diversion by the Brothers of the proceeds of a settlement 
agreement away from one of the limited partnerships and to Biloxi 3, LLC.
119
  
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, citing its decision in Dinuro 
Investments, LLC.
120
  Plaintiff “failed to show a direct harm and a special 
injury separate and distinct from that sustained by the other partners [and 
shareholders]” so a derivative action would have been the proper 
proceeding.
121
  The Third District Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration under the partnership 
and shareholder agreements.
122
 
4. Tortious Interference Claims:  Statute of Limitation 
On March 6, 2012, Mr. Eff (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against 
Sony Pictures (“Defendant”) and alleged that Defendant tortuously interfered 
in a business relationship that Plaintiff had with Mr. Silvera and another 
                                                          
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. 
116. Fritz v. Fritz, 219 So. 3d 234, 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
117. Id. at 236. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 236–39; see also Dinuro Invs., LLC v. Camacho, 141 So. 3d 731, 
740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
121. Fritz, 219 So. 3d at 238. 
122. Id. 
14
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person.
123
  Plaintiff alleged that he had a 25% interest in the movie Shottas 
(“the Movie”) “pursuant to an oral agreement” made with Mr. Silvera and 
another individual—who was not a party to the action—and that Plaintiff and 
Mr. Silvera formed Access Pictures, LLC, to produce the Movie.
124
  He 
further alleged that Defendant later made a licensing agreement with others 
whereby Defendant acquired “exclusive distribution rights to Shottas” after 
Mr. Silvera met with Defendant without Plaintiff.
125
  The trial court granted 
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the applicable four-year 
statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(o) of the Florida Statutes.
126
  
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.
127
  Under the licensing 
agreement with other parties, the Defendant was to make the initial payment 
on October 30, 2005 and other payments were alleged to have been made 
later.
128
  In May of 2007, Plaintiff’s lawyer emailed Defendant to advise him 
of Plaintiff’s interest in the Movie.129  The trial court ruled that October 30, 
2005 was the date on which the Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference 
accrued, and under the delayed discovery doctrine, May 2007 was therefore 
the latest that Plaintiff found out about any alleged tortious interference.
130
  
Thus, the lawsuit filed on March 6, 2012 was time barred under the four-year 
statute of limitation unless the continuing tort doctrine applied to Plaintiff’s 
claim.
131
  The Third District Court of Appeal described the continuing tort 
doctrine as being “established by continual tortious acts, not by continual 
harmful effects from an original, completed act.”132  The district court found 
“no Florida cases addressing the continuing tort doctrine as it pertains to a 
cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship.”133  The 
district court refused to apply the doctrine to Plaintiff’s claim because “the 
tort was not continual in nature merely because [Defendant] made 
subsequent distribution payments.  These additional distribution payments 
were merely ‘harmful effects from an original, completed act.’”134 
                                                          
123. Effs v. Sony Pictures Home Entm’t, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (2016). 
127. Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245. 
128. Id. at 1244. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. at 1243–44. 
132. Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245 (quoting Suarez v. City of Tampa, 987 So. 2d 
681, 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. (quoting Suarez, 987 So. 2d at 686). 
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C. Sale of Business 
1. Discovery:  Financial Information Provided to Accountant Not 
Protected by Accountant-Client Privilege 
In PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC v. Progressive Dental 
Reconstruction, Inc.,
135
 PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC (“Purchaser”) sought 
discovery of Progressive Dental Reconstruction’s (“Seller”) business and 
financial records given by Seller to Seller’s accountant for income tax 
purposes.
136
  Purchaser alleged that Seller acted fraudulently to accomplish 
the sale and that the records were necessary to establish its claim.
137
  The trial 
court denied the discovery request, and Purchaser sought immediate review 
of the trial court’s ruling.138  The First District Court of Appeal granted the 
petition for certiorari holding that the records were not shielded from the 
discovery request by the accountant-client privilege.
139
  Seller did not 
present any evidence that the records possessed by the accountant consisted 
of privileged communications or work product.
140
  The First District Court of 
Appeal held that otherwise discoverable records did not become privileged 
just because they were sent to Seller’s accountant.141  The trial court order 
was quashed and the case was remanded.
142
 
2. Valid Contract for Sale of Assets of Business Existed:  No Unjust 
Enrichment Remedy 
“The parties were at one point good friends and business associates,” 
said the Fourth District Court of Appeal before it explained the events 
leading up to the litigation.
143
  Mr. Brancato and Mrs. Brancato (“Surviving 
Spouse Seller”) sold the assets of a business144 to Valerie Fulton’s insurance 
agency, Fulton Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Insurance Agency Purchaser”), and 
Dean Fulton.
145
  Payment was to be based on commissions for the twelve-
                                                          
135. 203 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
136. Id. at 214. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC, 203 So. 3d at 214. 
141. Id. at 215. 
142. Id. 
143. Fulton v. Brancato, 189 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
144. Id.  The appellate court did not indicate the capacity in which Surviving 
Spouse Seller signed the sales agreement or if the agency was a separate entity.  Id. 
145. Id.  Surviving Spouse Seller sold the business when Mr. Brancato became 
ill, but the date of his death is not stated in the appellate opinion.  See id. 
16
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month period following the date of [the] [a]greement.
146
  When payments 
were not made as expected, Surviving Spouse Seller sued Valerie Fulton and 
Insurance Agency Purchaser alleging breach of contract.
147
  The jury found 
that Insurance Agency Purchaser had breached the contract which was the 
legal cause of the damage.
148
  However, the jury also found that Valerie 
Fulton and Insurance Agency Purchaser were unjustly enriched by getting 
the assets and not paying “the reasonable value of those assets,” and that they 
had converted the assets.
149
  The jury awarded total damages of $98,000 to 
Surviving Spouse Seller.
150
  On appeal, Valerie Fulton and Insurance Agency 
Purchaser contested the unjust enrichment and conversion verdicts, as well as 
Surviving Spouse Seller’s efforts to have the court pierce the corporate veil 
in order to hold Valerie Fulton personally liable.
151
  The appellate court said 
that a directed verdict should have been entered against Surviving Spouse 
Seller on the unjust enrichment count.
152
  If an express contract exists, as 
here, “an equitable theory, such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit” 
cannot be entertained.
153
  As to the conversion claim and damages, the 
appellate court held that the damages were to be confined to the $98,000 jury 
award for breach of contract, as “[t]here was no evidence that the seller 
sustained any additional damages by the buyer and the buyers’ agency’s 
conversion of other assets.”154 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146. Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 968. 
147. Id. at 969. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 969–70. 
152. Id. at 970. 
153. Id. at 969 (quoting Ocean Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d 1222, 
1225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). 
154. Id. at 970.  Does the such as limit the term equitable theory?  Id. at 969.  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck held that 
restitution—which requires the existence of a contract—is available in cases where there has 
been a breach of an express contract.  Ocean Commc’ns, Inc., 956 So. 2d at 1225; see also 
Barbara Landau, 2006–2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L. 
REV. 21, 58 (2007).  “A court of equity has the power to reform” a contract in the case of 
mutual mistake, scrivener’s error or inadvertence, and in cases of unilateral mistake of one 
party combined with inequitable conduct by the other party.  Goodall v. Whispering Woods 
Ctr., 990 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Barbara Landau, 2008–2009 Survey 
of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L. REV. 71, 97 (2009). 
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D. Non-Compete Agreements 
1. Injunction:  Where’s the Bond? 
In the next case, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction on 
March 29, 2012 in favor of Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Vital”) and against 
two of Vital’s former employees (“Employees”)—in an action against 
Employees and their new employer—Vital alleged breaches of non-compete 
clauses and tortious interference.
155
  In May 2012, the circuit court dissolved 
the injunction for reasons that are not stated in the court’s order.156  
Employees then sought damages and attorneys’ fees in the same action.157  
Damages were granted, Vital appealed the trial court’s order and was 
successful on appeal.
158
  This case stands for the proposition that if a 
temporary injunction is wrongfully issued, the persons wrongfully enjoined 
may sue for damages in the amount of the bond under Rule 1.610(b) of the 
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; but if a bond is not posted, damages cannot 
be collected, at least not pursuant to section 60.07 of the Florida Statutes.
159
  
It seems that no bond was required when the preliminary injunction was 
granted.
160
  Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s award of damages to Vital.161  Of course, in the absence of the bond, 
the injunction was not enforceable in the first place.
162
 
2. Breach During Term of Employment 
Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz
163
 was an interesting non-compete 
temporary injunction case.
164
  Joshua Mintz (“Mintz”) was employed by 
Telemundo (“Telemundo”).165  The term of employment was from January 1, 
                                                          
155. Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l Supplements, LLC, 210 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Order on Temporary Injunction at 1, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l 
Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012). 
156. Order on Motion to Dissolve Temporary Injunction, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. 
Prof’l Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012). 
157. Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 767–69 (citing Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 60.07 (2016); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b). 
160. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b); Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767. 
161. Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 768–69. 
162. See id. at 767–68. 
163. 194 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
164. Id. at 435. 
165. Id. 
18
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2015 through December 27, 2017.
166
  Mintz signed a non-compete agreement 
with Telemundo barring certain employment for six months after Mintz’s 
termination of employment with Telemundo.
167
  That part of the agreement 
provided that Mintz agreed he would “not, either directly or indirectly, 
provide services—as an employee or in any other status or capacity—to any 
Spanish-language media competitor of Telemundo in the news, 
entertainment, new media—e.g. the Internet, etc.—and telecommunications 
industries, within the United States.”168  The employment agreement 
contained an alternative dispute resolution provision in which Mintz agreed 
to follow Telemundo’s dispute resolution process.169  Mintz advised 
Telemundo that he was leaving to take a job in Mexico with a competitor of 
Telemundo.
170
  Mintz planned to start work at his new job within two months 
after he informed Telemundo that he was leaving.
171
  Telemundo sought 
injunctive relief to prevent Mintz from starting his new employment before 
the arbitration proceedings were complete.
172
  The trial court denied the 
motion, concluding that Mintz could work in Mexico because the covenant 
not to compete provision “only applied within the United States.”173  The 
Third District Court of Appeal reversed, directing the trial court to enter an 
order granting the temporary injunction.
174
  The appellate court reviewed the 
elements necessary for a temporary injunction
175
 and concluded that all 
elements necessary were present.
176
  The parties’ agreement provided that 
services to be provided by Mintz “were ‘of a special, unique, unusual, 
extraordinary, and intellectual character, giving them a peculiar value, the 
loss of which the Company cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated 
for in damages.’”177  It is apparent from the decision that the district court 
                                                          
166. Id.  Employer had an “irrevocable option to extend the term” for an 
additional year.  Id. 
167. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435.  The allegations in this case 
were as follows:  In November 2015, Mintz told Telemundo that Mintz planned to accept a 
job with one of Telemundo’s major competitors, at which point, Telemundo set the 
contractual alternative dispute resolution process in motion in late December.  Id.  Then, on 
January 7, 2016, Mintz told Telemundo that he was planning to leave to start working for the 
competitor on June 13, 2016.  Id.  This action was filed by Telemundo on January 11, 2016.  
Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435. 
170. Id. 
171. See id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436. 
175. Id. at 435–36. 
176. Id. at 436. 
177. Id. at 435. 
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concluded that the within the United States limitation did not apply to a 
breach of Mintz’s obligation “to provide his unique personal services 
exclusively to Telemundo for the contractually specified period,” as opposed 
to after the termination of the employment contract.
178
 
3. Failure to Establish the Absence of Irreparable Harm 
In 2015, Mr. Given (“Employee”), a regional sales manager in 
Georgia, while working for Allied Universal Corporation, a Florida 
corporation (“Former Employer”), signed a non-compete agreement “as a 
condition of continued employment.”179  Employee, who had been 
responsible for all of Former Employer’s sales territory north of Florida, 
resigned from his position with Former Employer in March 2016, and 
accepted a new position as a strategic account manager at a Georgia 
company that directly competed with Former Employer.
180
  Former 
Employer sought a temporary injunction to enforce the non-compete 
agreement.
181
  The motion was denied and Former Employer appealed.
182
  
The Third Circuit reversed, directing the trial court to grant the temporary 
injunction requested.
183
  Former Employer presented evidence that 
Employee’s new employment would cause Former Employer irreparable 
harm in the absence of a temporary injunction.
184
  This “create[d] a 
rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury” supporting the relief requested 
under section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes.
185
  Employee provided no 
evidence that would establish the absence to the Former Employer of the 
injury—contemplated by section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.186  In 
                                                          
178. Id. at 435–36.  The district court stated that “[t]his is notwithstanding the 
language in the exclusivity provision that the trial court construed to mean that [Employee] 
could provide his services to [Employer’s] competitor outside of the United States.”  
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436 n.1. 
179. Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, No. 3D16-1128, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017).  Employee was hired in 2010.  Id. 
180. Id.  The parties did not dispute the existence of a valid agreement not to 
compete, Employee had become an employee of Univar, that the new employment happened 
within one month after Employee resigned from his job with Former Employer, or that Univar 
competed with Former Employer.  See id. at 5 n.2.  The agreement called for an eighteen-
month non-compete period within 150 miles of any operational facility of Former Employer.  
Id. at 2. 
181. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 3. 
182. Id. at 1. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Id. at 7. 
185. Id. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j) (2016)). 
186. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 
542.335(1)(b)). 
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fact, Employee admitted that absent an injunction “he would begin managing 
a sales territory” for his new employer.187  The Third District Court of 
Appeal reminded us that it is not necessary that Former Employer actually 
prove irreparable harm before injunctive relief may properly be granted; 
quoting the Supreme Court of Florida in Capraro v. Lanier Business 
Products, Inc.,
188
 that “[i]t truly can be said in this type of litigation that 
relief delayed is relief denied.”189 
III. ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST THIRD PARTIES 
A. Tax Cases 
The constitutional challenge presented in Florida Department of 
Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc.
190
 arose out of the imposition of a sales tax by the 
State of Florida on satellite TV services at 10.8% while cable TV services 
were taxed at 6.8%.
191
  DIRECTV, Inc. and Echostar, LLC (“Satellite 
Companies”) sued the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”), the Florida 
Cable Telecommunications Association (“FCTA”), and others alleging that 
the Communications Services Tax (“CST”)192 is unconstitutional under the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.
193
  The relief sought, in addition to a 
declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of the tax, was a 
permanent injunction and a refund of the tax.
194
  The trial court agreed with 
the DOR, thus denying the tax refund and injunctive relief, but the First 
District Court of Appeal reversed, finding an as applied violation of the 
Commerce Clause; that is, the tax was found to be discriminatory in effect, 
although not in purpose.
195
  In so doing, the district court found that cable 
companies and Satellite Companies “were similarly situated because they 
both ‘operate in the same market and are direct competitors within that 
                                                          
187. Id. 
188. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). 
189. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 7–8 (quoting Capraro, 466 So. 2 at 
213). 
190. 215 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2017).  As of the date of submission of this Article,  
a petition for certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012). 
191. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2006).  
This discrepancy began with the enactment of the Communications Services Tax.  DIRECTV, 
Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.  That statute currently imposes a tax of 9.07% on satellite service, while 
cable service is taxed under that statute at a rate of 4.92%.  FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2015). 
192. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12. 
193. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 49–50. 
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market.’”196  The district court also concluded that cable companies are in-
state interests because of the extent of “their local infrastructure and local 
employment.”197  The First District Court of Appeal then held that “because 
the CST favors communications that use local infrastructure, it has a 
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.”198  The DOR and the FCTA 
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause had not been violated.
199
 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants to the 
United States Congress the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several [s]tates.”200  In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
long recognized that even on matters with respect to which the United States 
Congress has not legislated, certain state taxation may be barred by the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.
201
  Under the test set forth in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady
202
 (“Complete Auto test”), a state tax will not offend 
the Commerce Clause provided the tax “[(1)] is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does 
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State.”203  Satellite Companies relied on the third 
requirement and claimed that the tax had a discriminatory effect benefiting 
in-state commerce versus out-of-state interests.
204
 
The Supreme Court of Florida said that “[s]tatutes that openly 
discriminate against out-of-state economic interests in order to protect in-
state interests are subject to a per se rule of invalidity.”205  However, before 
discrimination against interstate commerce may be found, entities subject to 
disparate tax treatment must be determined to be similarly situated.
206
  The 
DOR took the position that satellite and cable companies are not similarly 
situated, but the Supreme Court of Florida did not agree.
207
  The Court, after 
noting that “[w]hat is required for entities to be considered substantially 
similar has not been extensively considered by the courts,” stated that “[i]t 
                                                          
196. Id. at 49. 
197. Id. 
198. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. 
199. Id. at 50, 55. 
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
201. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d. at 50 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)). 
202. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
203. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 
430 U.S. at 279). 
204. Id. at 51. 
205. Id. (quoting Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317, 330 (Fla. 2006)). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 51–52. 
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appears that, at the very least, the entities must be in competition with one 
another.”208  The Court concluded that cable TV and satellite TV were 
substantially similar businesses competing for the same customers.
209
  The 
Court then discussed whether cable companies were in-state entities, as 
argued by Satellite Companies.
210
  The Court found that both were out-of-
state businesses, holding that “[c]able is not a local, in-state interest any 
more than satellite.”211  Because both are out-of-state for Dormant 
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court said that Satellite Companies’ 
argument of discriminatory effect could not succeed.
212
  As to the 
discriminatory purpose argument made by Satellite Companies, the Court 
concluded that, notwithstanding the difference in tax rates, the applicable 
statute was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose and there was no intent 
to favor cable TV.
213
 
In the context of its discussion on whether cable companies are in-
state, the Court noted that “every state and federal court considering [satellite 
companies’ Dormant] Commerce Clause challenges brought by the satellite 
industry . . . has held that these [tax measures that favor cable] do not violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.”214  The Court noted that some cases have 
done so on the grounds that satellite and cable are not similarly situated,
215
 
while others have found that “cable is not an in-state interest.”216  The Court 
said it agreed with the latter group of decisions.
217
 
Florida Department of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp.
218
 
also involved a challenge based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, but in 
this case, the taxpayer, American Business USA Corp. (“Internet 
Corporation”), operated its business from Wellington, Florida.219  Internet 
Corporation was engaged in the online internet business of selling “flowers, 
gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property.”220  Internet 
Corporation did not keep an inventory of goods for sale, but would instead 
use florists that were located near the place to which the order was to be 
                                                          
208. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 51 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
Tax Comm’r of Ohio, 519 U.S. 278, 298–99 (1997)). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 52–53. 
211. Id. at 53. 
212. Id. 
213. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 54–55. 
214. Id. at 53. 
215. Id. at 53 n.1. 
216. Id. at 53–54, 54 n.2. 
217. Id. at 54. 
218. 191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017). 
219. Id. at 909 & n.1. 
220. Id. at 909 n.1. 
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delivered.
221
  Internet Corporation charged sales tax when flowers and other 
items were to be delivered to Florida customers.
222
  Internet Corporation did 
not charge sales tax on items delivered to customers in other states.
223
 
The statute that was challenged by Internet Corporation, section 
212.05(1)(l) of the Florida Statutes provides, in part, that “[f]lorists located 
in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail customers regardless of 
where or by whom the items are to be delivered.”224  Internet Corporation 
contested the DOR’s ruling that Internet Corporation was liable under this 
statute for tax on sales to non-Florida customers.
225
  The DOR’s ruling 
provided that “the tax required by [the statute was] a tax on the privilege of 
engaging in business in Florida and is not a tax on the property sold.”226  On 
appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Internet Corporation alleged 
that the imposition of the tax with respect to Internet Corporation’s sales to 
out-of-state customers was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and in violation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.
227
  The Fourth District Court of Appeal 
ruled that taxing internet “sales to out-of-state customers . . . violate[d] the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.”228  The DOR appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Florida, and the Court quashed the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
decision.
229
  The Supreme Court of Florida applied the Complete Auto test to 
determine if the imposition of the tax violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.
230
  After a lengthy examination of the facts of the case, the Court 
determined that the tax passed muster—satisfying the four prongs of the 
Complete Auto test—and thus, the tax did not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.
231
 
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that if Internet 
Corporation did not have any physical presence in Florida, the imposition of 
the tax on sales to out-of-state customers would have clearly violated the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.
232
  But, based on Internet Corporation’s 
presence in Florida, with its headquarters being located in Wellington, 
Florida, and Internet Corporation “doing business in Florida since 2001 . . . 
                                                          
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 909 & n.1. 
223. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909 n.1. 
224. Id. at 908; see also FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(l) (2012). 
225. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 909. 
229. Id. at 908. 
230. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 912. 
231. Id. at 917. 
232. Id. at 914. 
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accept[ing] internet orders” from that location, the Court found that the 
substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was satisfied.
233
  Those 
facts also served to defeat Internet Corporation’s due process argument of 
lack of minimum contacts.
234
 
In the next case, the First District Court of Appeal certified the 
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter “of great 
public importance:  Does the ‘Local Option Tourist Development Act,’ 
Codified at Section 125.0104, [of the] Florida Statutes, impose a tax on the 
total amount . . . received by an . . . on-line travel company’s website, or only 
on the amount the property owner re[covers] for the rental of the 
accommodations?”235 
The Supreme Court of Florida rephrased the question as follows:  
“Are the total monetary amounts that [online travel companies] charge their 
customers to secure reservations for transient accommodation rentals in 
Florida . . . subject to taxation under section 125.0104 [of the] Florida 
Statutes?”236 
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative, 
holding that the tax can only be imposed on the amount paid to the transient 
lessor—the hotel, motel, or other provider of accommodations—and not on 
the total amount paid to the online travel company, that difference being 
referred to as the mark-up.
237
  Justices Labarga and Quince concurred with 
                                                          
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 914, 917.  The Court, discussing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, stated 
that “[d]ue process requires only that there be some minimal connection between the state and 
the transaction it seeks to tax.”  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992).  The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Quill Corp. 
and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue stated the following with respect to 
the alleged due process violation:  “We have concluded that American Business’[] activities 
have a substantial nexus to Florida.  Thus, the minimum connection required to satisfy due 
process is also met.”  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp, 504 U.S. at 307; 
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), abrogated by Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  Of course, the converse is not necessarily the 
case, as the district court pointed out, again, citing Quill Corp. for the proposition that a 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause may exist even where there is no due process 
violation.  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 910. 
235. Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. 2015) (quoting 
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 110 So. 3d 941, 951–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g 
denied, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015)). 
236. Id. at 733; see also Broward Cty. v. Orbitz, LLC, 135 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table 
decision); Leon Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 128 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (mem.) 
(per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table decision). 
237. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 732, 737.  The mark-up was said to be 
“between [25%] and [45%].”  Id. at 738–39.  The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, 
Third Division, in City of Chicago v. Expedia, had before it a controversy regarding the 
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the opinion of Justice Perry, Justice Pariente concurred in the result and 
wrote a separate opinion, and Justice Canady concurred in the result; while 
Justice Lewis dissented with the opinion with Justice Polston concurring in 
the dissent.
238
 
The next two cases are district court decisions involving sales 
taxes.
239
  In the first, an agreement was reached during the DOR’s sales tax 
audit of Verizon Business Purchasing, LLC (“LLC”), by which the parties 
agreed to extend the statute of limitations on the tax assessment until March 
31, 2011.
240
  On February 8, 2011, the DOR sent LLC a Notice of Proposed 
Assessment (“NOPA”) for more than $3 million plus interest.241  The DOR 
advised LLC that an informal protest could be filed by April 11, 2011, 
administrative review could be sought, or judicial proceedings could be 
instituted by LLC, but if LLC did not file a protest, the assessment would 
become final on April 11, 2011.
242
  LLC was also informed that in the 
absence of an informal protest, “‘an administrative hearing or judicial 
proceeding, . . . [had to be brought] no later than [June 8, 2011] or [sixty] 
days from the date the assessment’” became final.243  LLC was also advised 
that if a protest was not filed, “the proposed assessment [would] become a 
                                                                                                                                         
Chicago Hotel Accommodations Tax (“CHAT”), under Chicago Municipal Code § 3-24-010 
(1990).  City of Chi. v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1-15-3402, 2017 WL 1511961, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Apr. 26), withdrawn, May 16, 2017.  The court in Illinois stated that “[w]ell after the CHAT 
ordinance was enacted, the Internet was invented and, eventually, profitable [online travel 
companies] began operating.  The [City of Chicago] has joined numerous taxing authorities 
who have attempted to apply established tax provisions to [online travel companies’] online 
business model.”  Id. at *2.  The court went to explain that the results from cases in other 
jurisdictions may be of limited assistance because of differences in statutory language.  Id.  
For example, in Orbitz, LLC v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, the Tax Court of 
Indiana declined to “rely on [out of state decisions] or find them persuasive” because of state-
specific statutory language upon which the case’s resolution was dependent.  Orbitz, LLC v. 
Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 66 N.E. 3d 1012, 1015–16 n.4 (Ind. T.C. 2016).  Just a word of 
caution—as true today in the age of immediate and magic cite checking as it was in the days 
of only paper books and supplements:  Orbitz, LLC did not expressly cite Alachua County, 
although the parties’ briefs may have, but a cite check of Alachua County disclosed that 
Orbitz, LLC declined to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s Alachua County decision.  Id. at 
1015 n.4; see also Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.  But did it?  Compare Orbitz, LLC, 66 
N.E. 3d at 1018 with Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. 
238. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. 
239. See Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 191 So. 
3d 516, 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-967 2016 WL 5407681 
(Fla. 2016); Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. State, 164 So. 3d 806, 807–08 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
240. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 807–08. 
241. Id. at 808. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
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FINAL ASSESSMENT on [April 11, 2011].”244  LLC filed suit against the 
DOR challenging the NOPA on statute of limitations grounds, asserting that 
the DOR had been required to make an assessment before March 31, 2011.
245
  
The DOR successfully moved for summary judgment and LLC appealed.
246
  
The district court concluded that the DOR’s assessment of the tax was barred 
by the statute of limitations on assessment.
247
  The statute of limitations 
contained in section 95.091(3)(a)1.b. of the Florida Statutes requires that any 
tax due under section 72.011 of the Florida Statutes must be “determine[d] 
and assess[ed] . . . within [three] years after the date the tax is due, any return 
with respect to tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.”248  
Thus, the question presented was whether the DOR’s assessment was 
timely.
249
  As noted above, the DOR had, by agreement, until March 31, 
2011, to assess the tax.
250
  The NOPA was issued on February 8, 2011.
251
  
The DOR argued that the date the NOPA was issued, February 8, 2011, was 
the date it assessed the tax against LLC.
252
  Thus, according to the DOR, the 
assessment was timely.
253
  It was conceded by “the parties [that] section 
95.091 does not define the [term] assess.”254  LLC pointed out that under 
section 213.21(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations on 
assessments is tolled when informal protests are filed.
255
  LLC argued, in 
effect, and the district court agreed, that there would be no purpose for that 
tolling provision if the NOPA was the assessment, as the assessment would 
have been made.
256
  The First District Court of Appeal agreed “that the 
assessment contemplated in [section 95.091(3)(a)] is a final assessment.”257  
As the district court pointed out, since there is a sixty-day period between the 
NOPA and the date the NOPA becomes final, if the taxpayer does not file a 
protest, all the DOR would have had to do in this case was to issue the 
NOPA at least “sixty days prior to . . . March 31, 2011.”258  In answering the 
                                                          
244. Id. (alteration in original). 
245. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808. 
246. Id. at 808–09. 
247. Id. at 812–13. 
248. Id. at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a)1.b (2010). 
249. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809. 
250. Id. at 808. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 809–10. 
254. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 
95.091 (2010). 
255. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808; see also FLA. STAT. § 
213.21(1)(b) (2010). 
256. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 811–12. 
257. Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a). 
258. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 812. 
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question presented, that is, whether NOPA was the assessment contemplated 
by section 95.091(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, or whether the date the 
NOPA became final was the assessment, the district court, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, concluded that the pertinent statute of limitations 
referred to a final assessment and the NOPA was not a final assessment.
259
 
American Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Department of 
Revenue
260
 involved an assessment of sales tax and interest against American 
Heritage Window Fashions, LLC (“LLC”) for more than $220,000.261  On 
March 29, 2010, the DOR served a NOPA on LLC, and pursuant to section 
72.011(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, informed LLC of its options 
to contest the assessment.
262
  LLC did not avail itself of any of the options.
263
  
Collection efforts by the DOR began at the end of 2010, and on April 1, 
2013, almost three years after the relevant periods stated in the NOPA 
expired, the DOR obtained $7,507.58 from an account that the DOR had 
ordered frozen back on May 10, 2011, “of which $6,525.95 was applied to 
the . . . deficiency, roughly [3%] of the assessed sum.”264  On July 10, 2013, 
LLC requested a refund of the amount applied to the deficiency, alleging 
“that it was an audit overpayment.”265  The DOR declined “the request on 
August 26, 2013, and [LLC] filed a written protest on September 25, 2013 . . 
. [seeking] ‘to appeal the Notice of Proposed Assessment’” based on its 
argument regarding the underlying liability.
266
  The DOR denied the protest 
on the merits which “made final the [DOR’s] denial of [the LLC’s] refund 
application.”267  LLC sought further administrative review, and eventually 
the matter found its way to the Second District Court of Appeal.
268
  The 
district court affirmed the DOR’s determination that LLC’s challenge was 
untimely.
269
  To bring what amounted to an untimely action to contest a tax 
assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances, 
like those presented in this case, would, said the court, “render the statute’s 
sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments 
                                                          
259. Id. at 811–12; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a). 
260. 191 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-
967 2016 WL 5407681 (Fla. 2016). 
261. Id. at 517. 
262. Id. at 517–18; see also FLA STAT. § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (2010). 
263. Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518. 
269. Id. at 524. 
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meaningless.”270  Section 72.011(5) of the Florida Statutes “is the language 
of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.”271 
ValleyCrest Landscape Maintenance, Inc. (“ValleyCrest”) sued the 
DOR for a refund of motor fuel tax paid.
272
  ValleyCrest, which is in the 
business of residential and commercial landscaping, uses lawn equipment 
that runs on diesel fuel and gas, both purchased by ValleyCrest at retail fuel 
stations.
273
  ValleyCrest argued that the second gas tax authorized under the 
Article XII, section 9(c) of the Florida Constitution applies only to motor 
vehicles, and the tax under section 206.41(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes 
applies only to vehicles operated on public roads and not “to off-road uses of 
gasoline.”274  ValleyCrest also argued that not giving it an exemption, and 
hence a refund of the taxes, amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.
275
  The trial court 
ruled in favor of the DOR, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.
276
  
Section 206.41(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes exempts from the motor fuel tax 
on gasoline anyone “‘who uses any motor fuel for agricultural, aquacultural, 
commercial fishing, or commercial aviation purposes,’” provided that the 
fuel is not “‘used in any vehicle or equipment driven or operated on public 
highways of [Florida],’” and provided that a refund is requested.277  
ValleyCrest was being taxed on fuel it used operating its off-road 
equipment.
278
  The district court of appeal first noted that “there is no use-
based exemption for landscaping equipment” as there is for the other 
enumerated uses.
279
  The legislature has broad power to create distinctions 
and classifications in tax statutes.
280
  These distinctions can be upheld 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause so long as there are non-
arbitrary reasons for so doing.
281
  As an example, in this case, the district 
court also noted that the landscaping business did not have the same 
                                                          
270. Id. at 521. 
271. Id. at 522 (citing Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So. 
2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam)); see also FLA. STAT. § 72.011(5) (2010). 
272. See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc. v. State, 213 So. 3d 992, 994 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12079 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 
2016), and review denied, 2017 WL 192041 (Fla. 2017). 
273. Id. 
274. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 206.41(1)(a) (2016). 
275. ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994. 
276. Id. 
277. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 206.41(4)(c)1. 
278. See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994. 
279. Id. at 994–95. 
280. Id. at 995. 
281. See id. 
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economic impact on the state as did the agricultural, commercial fishing, and 
aviation industries.
282
 
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC (“LLC”) challenged its 2008 ad 
valorem tax assessment by filing suit in the circuit court in 2009 against 
Hillsborough County.
283
  LLC paid the “2008 taxes in an amount . . . 
admitted in good faith was due and owing” pursuant to section 194.171(3) of 
the Florida Statutes.
284
  LLC did not timely pay the 2009 real estate tax, but it 
did timely pay real estate taxes assessed after 2009.
285
  The property 
appraiser successfully moved to have LLC’s 2009 complaint dismissed based 
on section 194.171(5) of the Florida Statutes because the 2009 tax was not 
timely paid.
286
  LLC appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial court’s decision.287  The statute requires only that all taxes 
assessed for years after the year the taxpayer’s action is brought be timely 
paid, not that taxes for the year in which the taxpayer’s action is brought be 
timely paid.
288
 
B. Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate, Deeds, and Landlord-Tenant 
Cases 
1. Real Estate Contract:  Specific Performance Denied 
Real estate developer (“Seller”) entered into an agreement with 
Appellees (“Purchaser”) for the sale and purchase of property “adjacent to 
the Mardi Gras, a Daytona Beach business”289 having “a minimum of [fifty] 
frontage feet on the Boardwalk and [also having] ‘sufficient land to build a 
                                                          
282. Id. at 995–96. 
283. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC v. Henriquez, 194 So. 3d 1091, 1091–
92 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
284. Id. at 1092; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(3) (2009). 
285. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092. 
286. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(5). 
287. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092. 
288. Id. at 1093. 
289. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. Paspalakis, 220 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 212 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017), review 
denied, No. SC17-568, 2017 WL 2438408 (Fla. 2017).  This was a “public-private economic 
development project,” but the events here apparently predated the amendment of Article X § 
6(a) of Florida’s Constitution in 2007.  FLA. CONST. art X § 6; Boardwalk at Daytona Dev. 
LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459 n.1; see also Eileen Zaffiro-Kean, Daytona Boardwalk Property Fight 
Continues, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Nov. 26, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.news-
journalonline.com/news/20161126/daytona-boardwalk-property-fight-continues.  There are no 
dates set forth in the district court’s opinion with respect to the transactions or the proceedings 
in the trial court.  Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459; Zaffiro-Kean, supra. 
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7500 square foot, one story building.’”290  As it turned out, three parcels of 
real estate potentially fit this description.
291
  Seller requested declaratory 
relief that a parcel of real estate that it tendered to the Purchaser was in 
conformance with the parties’ agreement, while Purchaser filed a 
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the transfer to Purchaser by Seller of 
a different parcel.
292
  The trial court ordered specific performance as to one 
of these parcels and Seller appealed.
293
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that it was error to order specific performance in this case 
because “[s]pecific performance is only available to compel the transfer of 
land that is specifically described in the parties’ agreement alone or where its 
identity is clear from an agreement that is appropriately supplemented by 
parol evidence,”294 which was not something that could be satisfied on this 
record.
295
  The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order of specific 
performance and Purchaser filed a motion for rehearing.
296
  On motion for 
rehearing, which was denied, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded 
that Purchaser had chosen to pursue one remedy in its litigation, that is, 
specific performance.
297
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal said that 
Purchasers “freely made their choice . . . to not pursue different causes of 
action or other remedies, such as money damages, reformation, or 
rescission.”298 
2. Arbitration Requirement Contained in Real Estate Contract Not 
Waived 
The contract for sale to Appellees (“Purchasers”) of an outparcel of 
Timber Pine’s (“Seller”) shopping mall contained a binding arbitration 
clause, and the amended deed restrictions contained restrictions that gave 
Seller certain approval rights over construction on the property it sold to 
                                                          
290. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459. 
291. Id. at 459. 
292. Id. at 460.  There was a claim for damages exceeding $15,000 contained 
in Purchaser’s amended counterclaim, but the appellate court noted that such damages were 
not mentioned again in the counterclaim.  Id. at 460 n.2.  Purchaser’s claim for money 
damages becomes the subject of the appellate court’s comments on denial by the court of 
Purchaser’s motion for rehearing on the appeal.  Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. 
Paspalakis, 212 So. 3d 1063, 1063–64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
293. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 460. 
294. Id. at 459. 
295. Id. 
296. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063; Boardwalk at 
Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459. 
297. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063–64. 
298. Id. at 1064. 
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Purchasers.
299
  Purchasers consented in writing to these amendments.
300
  
After the closing, Seller sued Purchasers seeking injunctive relief and 
damages based on Purchasers’ alleged violation of Seller’s construction 
approval rights.
301
  The injunction was denied, and the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial.302  Purchasers meanwhile answered 
the complaint and counterclaimed alleging Seller breached the contract by 
failing to provide input on the plans for Purchasers’ building and failure to 
provide a cross-parking easement.
303
  Seller moved to compel arbitration of 
Purchasers’ counterclaim.304  The trial judge denied the motion without 
explanation; the Seller appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
reversed and remanded with instructions.
305
  The right to arbitration can be 
waived, and such waiver may be deemed to have occurred if the party 
demanding arbitration has resorted to the courts to enforce its claims 
otherwise subject to arbitration.
306
  However, here, there was no significant 
relationship between Seller’s rights under the amended deed restrictions and 
the arbitration clause in the antecedent contract.
307
  Therefore, Seller’s suit 
against Purchasers did not constitute a waiver of arbitration under the 
contract with respect to Purchasers’ counterclaim alleging breach of 
contract.
308
  “[T]he mere coincidence that the parties in dispute have a 
contractual relationship will ordinarily not be enough to mandate arbitration 
of the dispute.”309 
3. No Merger in Deed 
The next case provides a discussion of an exception to the general 
rule that “preliminary agreements concerning the sale of [real] property 
merge into the deed executed pursuant to the sale.”310  Mr. Harkless, in 2008, 
                                                          
299. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, 211 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. (citing Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, No. 5D16-95, 2016 WL 
7405671, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision)). 
303. Id. 
304. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d at 1149. 
305. Id. at 1150–51. 
306. See id. 
307. Id. at 1151. 
308. Id. 
309. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d. at 1150 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)). 
310. Harkless v. Laubhan, 219 So. 3d 900, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), 
reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2017). 
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leased part of his real estate to Verizon Wireless and granted it an easement 
for the construction of a cell tower, but the construction did not begin until 
May 2012.
311
  In the interim, the property on which the tower was to be 
located, and with respect to which the easement was granted, was transferred 
twice.
312
  The first transfer occurred in April 2011 when Mr. Harkless sold to 
Mr. and Mrs. Lolly ten acres of his property—including the land leased to 
Verizon Wireless and subject to the easement.
313
  There was an addendum 
(“the Addendum”) to the Harkless-Lolly contract that stated, in part, that Mr. 
Harkless would continue to own the “easement and Verizon cell tower 
lease.”314  No mention was made in the warranty deed to the Lollys from Mr. 
Harkless of any right on the part of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments 
from Verizon.
315
  The Lollys, just three months after the transfer to them, 
sold the real estate to Mr. and Mrs. Laubhan.
316
  The language in the 
contract, between the Lollys and the Laubhans, differed from the language in 
the Addendum to the Harkless-Lolly contract.
317
  The Lolly-Laubhan 
contract stated, in part, that “[b]uyer is aware of Verizon tower lease and has 
received a copy of the survey and lease.”318  By warranty deed in July 2011, 
the Lollys transferred the property to the Laubhans—the deed making no 
mention of any right of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments from 
Verizon.
319
  But that was not all that happened in the interim, as Mr. 
Harkless, sometime prior to May 2012, gave a third party, Communications 
Capital Group, LLC, an “option to purchase his interest in the Lease for 
$175,000.”320  Communications Capital Group, LLC then sought signed and 
notarized confirmation from the Laubhans that they acknowledged Mr. 
Harkless’ rights to continue to receive rent from Verizon Wireless pursuant 
to the lease.
321
  Because the requested response was not forthcoming and the 
response instead was that “they owned the Parcel free and clear of Mr. 
Harkless’ right to receive rent,” the option was not exercised.322  At this 
point, Mr. Harkless sought declaratory relief regarding his right to the rent, 
                                                          
311. Id. at 902. 
312. Id. at 902–03. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 903. 
315. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 903. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id.  Both deeds did, however, make mention of an easement.  Harkless, 
219 So. 3d at 903–04. 
320. Id. at 903. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
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plus reformation of both deeds reflecting his rights under the Verizon 
Wireless lease.
323
 
The Laubhans filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on the 
deeds and another agreement mentioned in both deeds, and argued that there 
was no ambiguity that would permit the consideration of parol evidence.
324
  
They also claimed that they were not aware, prior to the litigation, that there 
was a Harkless-Lolly agreement that Mr. Harkless retained his right to the 
rent.
325
  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Laubhans, 
and Mr. Harkless appealed.
326
  The appellate court decided that because the 
Lollys and Mr. Harkless, being all the parties to the agreement that reserved 
the rent to Mr. Harkless, agreed that the Addendum language “was intended 
to reserve Mr. Harkless’s right to” the lease payments, that the right did not 
merge into the deed to the Lollys “as a matter of law.”327  Mr. Harkless 
effectively reserved his right to receive rent, that is, his contract with the 
Lollys and the reservation of the right to the rent did not merge into the 
deed.
328
  The district court concluded that summary judgment should not 
have been granted because the question remaining on remand as to whether 
the Laubhans were bona fide purchasers for value, created a “genuine issue 
of material fact.”329  At this point, the Second District Court of Appeal 
addressed the issue of whether the Laubhans could be bona fide purchasers 
under Florida’s recording statute, section 695.01(1) of the Florida Statutes.330  
The court, after noting that the parties had not identified any cases addressing 
whether the recording statute applies to the right to receive rent and the court 
had found none, held that the plain language of the statute provides that “[n]o 
conveyance . . . of real property, or of any interest therein” shall be valid 
against bona fide purchasers unless properly recorded.
331
  The Second 
District Court of Appeal concluded that the right to receive rent is covered 
                                                          
323. Id. 
324. Harkless, 219 So. 3d. at 903–04.  The other agreement that was referred to 
in both deeds was “the Amended Memorandum of Lease Agreement” which the district court 
described as “essentially an abridged version of the Lease” that did not mention any right 
retained by Mr. Harkless to receive payments under the Verizon Wireless lease.  Id. at 903.  
The district court declined to accept any line of decision out of other district courts, citing 
cases from the Third District and the Fourth District, that the words subject to in a deed could 
result in the deed being rendered generally ambiguous.  Id. at 906. 
325. Id. at 903. 
326. Id. at 902, 904. 
327. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 905. 
328. Id. at 909. 
329. Id. at 902, 909. 
330. Id. at 908–09; see also FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2011). 
331. FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1); Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908. 
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by the statute
 
and remanded for a determination of the Laubhans status as 
bona fide purchasers.
332
 
4. Denial of Temporary Injunction in Suit Based on Deed Restrictions 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. (“Planned Parenthood”) 
bought real property subject to deed restrictions.
333
  MMB Properties 
(“MMB”), a general partnership that runs a cardiology practice in the same 
medical complex, is subject to the same deed restrictions.
334
  Planned 
Parenthood intended to offer abortion services at the facility, and MMB—
claiming that performance of such services violated the deed restriction—
sought and obtained from the circuit court a temporary injunction that 
enjoined Planned Parenthood from performing abortions at the facility.
335
  
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the temporary 
injunction, finding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.
336
  The district court also found that in order to have 
the temporary injunction dissolved, as had been sought by Planned 
Parenthood, it “needed to establish changed circumstances which it did not 
do.”337  The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal’s affirmance of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to 
the trial court for a hearing on a permanent injunction.
338
  The Court claimed 
conflict jurisdiction involving the standard for modifying or dissolving a 
temporary injunction; the Court noting that the First, Second, Third, and 
Fifth Districts all require changed circumstances, while the Fourth District 
does not.
339
  The Court adopted the position of the Fourth District, noting 
that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo 
pending final injunctive proceedings.
340
  The principle has developed that a 
party seeking to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction must show 
changed conditions or changed circumstances to justify modification or 
dissolution of the injunction.
341
  However, there is no such requirement in 
Rule 1.610(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
342
  The Court 
                                                          
332. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908–09. 
333. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 
918, 920 (Fla. 2017). 
334. See id. 
335. Id. at 920–22. 
336. Id. at 923–24. 
337. Id. at 923. 
338. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 929. 
339. Id. at 924–25. 
340. Id. at 924–26. 
341. Id. at 924. 
342. Id.; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610(d). 
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concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion “to reconsider, on a 
motion to dissolve, a temporary injunction entered after notice and a hearing, 
. . . regardless of whether the arguments or evidence could have been brought 
to the attention of the court at the hearing on the injunction.”343  In other 
words, the changed circumstances rule in this context is no more.
344
  The 
Court went beyond the conflict jurisdiction issue and found that the trial 
court’s decision, granting the temporary injunction and declining to dissolve 
it, was not supported by competent substantial evidence—particularly with 
respect to the likelihood of MMB succeeding on the merits.
345
 
5. Self-Help Provision in Lease Invalid 
The lease between (“Landlord”) and (“Tenant”) gave Landlord 
certain self-help authority if an Event of Default occurred, including the 
authority “after the continued Tenant default after the expiration of the time 
to cure” and “without further written notice to Tenant . . . enter upon and 
take possession of the Leased Premises and expel or remove Tenant and any 
other occupant therefrom with or without having terminated the lease.”346  
The agreement further provided that [l]andlord shall not be deemed to have 
violated any right of Tenant and shall not be deemed to be guilty of trespass, 
conversion or any other criminal or civil action as a result of such action.”347  
The day came when Landlord found it necessary to lock Tenant out of much 
of the leased premises and obtain police help in escorting Tenant’s 
employees off the premises.
348
 
                                                          
343. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 925. 
344. Id. at 926. 
345. See id. at 928.  Justice Canady, joined by Justice Polston, dissented.  Id. at 
929 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
346. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters., 
211 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC17-491, 2017 WL 
2774368 (Fla. 2017). 
347. Id.  The appellate court did not discuss the introductory provision of the 
language quoted in the text above.  See id.  The provision began as follows:  “[I]f and 
whenever any Event of Default by Tenant shall occur, Landlord may after the continued 
Tenant default after the expiration of the time to cure . . . at its option and without further 
written notice to Tenant.”  Id.  Presumably, the language was deemed not crucial to the court’s 
conclusion.  See id. 
348. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.  The 
leased premises included a restaurant and office space.  Id.  The restaurant was closed by the 
City of Palm Beach Gardens based on Tenant not obtaining the right permits.  Id.  The city 
posted “red tags on the doors, which indicated the restaurant was unsafe for occupancy.”  Id.  
“The same day, Landlord [installed] chains and locks on the . . . kitchen [doors], the 
restaurant,” and the office doors.  Id.  Several days later, the lease was terminated by 
Landlord, and the Landlord “had the police escort Tenant’s employees from the restaurant.”  
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.  It is not clear from the 
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Each party filed claims against the other.
349
  Landlord alleged that 
Tenant breached the terms of the lease, and Tenant alleged conversion in 
addition to wrongful eviction.
350
  A directed verdict on the claim of wrongful 
eviction was entered by the court against Landlord on Tenant’s motion, and 
the jury awarded $8.8 million in damages against Landlord plus found 
liability as to the conversion claim and awarded $2 million to Tenant.
351
  The 
jury also ruled against Landlord on its breach of contract claim.
352
  On 
appeal, Landlord challenged the propriety of the directed verdict against it.
353
  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the directed verdict under the 
authority of section 83.05(2) of the Florida Statutes, which sets out the only 
methods by which a landlord may repossess, leased premises from a 
defaulting tenant.
354
  The methods are by an action based on section 83.20 or 
other civil action that determines the right to possession, or where the tenant 
has surrendered or abandoned the rented space.
355
  Landlord did not employ 
any of the approved eviction methods, and the self-help provisions in the 
lease agreement availed the Landlord nothing.
356
  Tenant also challenged the 
trial judge’s decision not to award pre-judgment interest on the eviction 
damages award.
357
  The Fourth District held that since Tenant received an 
award purely of a fixed amount of money damages, the trial court had no 
discretion in the matter and should have awarded pre-judgment interest 
“from the date of the loss or the accrual of [the] cause of action.”358  Tenant, 
however, did not fare as well on the issue of the $2 million in damages 
awarded on its conversion claim.
359
  Conversion requires the exercise of 
control over and acts that are not consistent with “another’s possessory rights 
in personal property.”360  There was lack of proof to support the award.361  
                                                                                                                                         
opinion how Tenant’s employees were still in the restaurant, which was padlocked several 
days earlier, but there were other leased areas including an atrium, a ballroom, and two 
meeting rooms, which may be where the employees were.  See id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. 
353. See id. 
354. Id. at 44–45; see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2) (2006). 
355. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44–45; 
see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2), 83.20 (2006). 
356. See Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45. 
357. Id. at 46. 
358. See id. (quoting Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 46 (Fla. 
2010) (per curiam)). 
359. See id. at 45–47. 
360. Id. at 45 (quoting Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006)). 
361. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 46. 
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Furthermore, the court held that “‘an action in tort is inappropriate where the 
basis of the suit is a contract, either express or implied.’”362  The directed 
verdict, as to the eviction damages, was affirmed, the conversion damages 
award was reversed, and the denial of pre-judgment interest on eviction 
award was reversed and remanded.
363
 
Landlord raised an interesting argument in support of its position 
that the directed verdict on the wrongful eviction claim was improper.
364
  
The argument was that this was not a total eviction, but rather just a partial[] 
evict[ion], since Tenant was not locked out of all of the leased premises.
365
  
The court responded that “[a]lthough the issue of whether a tenant can be 
partially evicted appears to be an issue of first impression in Florida, we 
need not address it here.”366  The court then stated that it found “no evidence 
to support Landlord’s contention that it intended to allow Tenant to use that 
part of the leasehold . . . or that Tenant could still maintain its other business 
operations without the restaurant.”367 
C. Torts 
1. Construction Defects:  Applicable Statute of Limitation 
Almost ten years after the closing on property upon which Lennar 
Homes (“Builder”) constructed a home for the homeowner (“Purchaser”), 
Builder was served by Purchaser with the required notice pursuant to Section 
558 of the Florida Statutes.
368
  Purchaser subsequently filed suit against 
Builder alleging home construction defects.
369
  When the suit was filed, more 
than ten years had elapsed since the date of the closing, and Builder defended 
citing section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes, the ten-year statute of 
repose applicable to construction defect claims.
370
  Section 95.11(3)(c) 
provides, in part, that 
                                                          
362. Id. (quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). 
363. Id. at 47. 
364. Id. at 45. 
365. Id. 
366. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45. 
367. Id. 
368. Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So. 3d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2017); see also FLA. STAT. § 558.004 (2016).  Section 558.004(1) of the Florida Statutes 
requires that in cases of construction defect claims not involving personal injury, a claimant, 
“at least [sixty] days before filing” suit, is required to serve a “written notice of claim on the 
contractor.”  FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1). 
369. Busch, 219 So. 3d at 94–95. 
370. Id. at 94; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016). 
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“[i]n any event, the action must be commenced within [ten] years 
after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the 
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, . . . the date of completion 
or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, 
registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, 
whichever date is latest.”
371
 
Builder claimed that the contract was complete as of the closing so 
the ten-year period started to run at closing of the sale which would mean 
that the period had expired.
372
  The complaint was dismissed, and Purchaser 
appealed.
373
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the contract 
attached to the complaint that contained language indicating that it was 
possible for the contract not to be completed until after closing, and the court 
ruled that “[b]ecause the contract expressly contemplated that closing could 
occur even if work required by the contract remained incomplete, and the 
complaint did not allege that no work was completed after closing, the 
allegations of the complaint do not conclusively establish that the contract 
was completed upon closing.”374  In other words, the District Court 
concluded that the complaint failed to conclusively establish that the ten-year 
period started to run at closing.
375
  Therefore, the complaint should not have 
been dismissed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded.
376
 
On a related note, in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster 
Specialty Insurance Co.,
377
 the United States Court of Appeal for the 
Eleventh Circuit certified the following question of first impression to the 
Supreme Court of Florida:  “Is the notice and repair process set forth in 
Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes a suit within the meaning of the 
[commercial general liability] policies issued by [insurance company] to 
[contractor]?”378 
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court of Florida 
will decide Altman Contractors, Inc., or whether that decision dealing with 
insurer’s duty to defend will have an impact on construction defect claims 
subject to section 95.11(3)(c), or the tolling statute under section 558.004(10) 
of the Florida Statutes, remains to be seen.
379
  The latter section provides that 
                                                          
371. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c). 
372. Busch, 219 So. 3d at 95. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. at 95–96 (emphasis added). 
375. See id. at 94. 
376. Id. at 94, 96. 
377. 832 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2016). 
378. Id. at 1326. 
379. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 558.004(10) 
(2016). 
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service by a claimant of written notice of claim under section 558.004(1) 
“tolls the applicable statute of limitations.”380  It should be noted that there is 
no express reference in section 558.004(10) to the statute of repose contained 
in section 558.004(1).
381
 
2. Slip and Fall:  Invitee, Uninvited Licensee, or Trespasser 
While walking home at about 11:00 P.M., after an evening out, Mrs. 
Arp (“Mrs. Arp”) took a cut through shortcut “over a pathway of paver 
stones located in the area of a utility easement on property owned by W.E. 
Association and operated as a shopping center.”382  Plaintiff stepped on a 
cracked stone, turned her ankle, and fell.
383
  “The [shortcut] did not have a 
No Trespassing sign,” and Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that she 
witnessed other people taking the shortcut regularly.
384
  She did not go into 
any of the shopping center stores that evening, and was using the shortcut 
“because she ‘just wanted to get home.’”385  She sued Waterway East 
Association, Inc. (“Waterway”), among others, alleging negligence.386  The 
trial court granted Waterway’s motion for summary judgment, and the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.
387
  The appellate court first noted 
that under common law, there are three categories of persons who enter onto 
private property, specifically, “an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.”388  
After defining the invitee as “a visitor on the premises by invitation, either 
express or reasonably implied, of the owner,” the district court defined “[a]n 
uninvited licensee [as] a person who chooses ‘to come upon the premises 
solely for [his or her] own convenience without invitation either expressed or 
reasonably implied under the circumstances.’”389  The district court defined a 
trespasser as one “who enters the premises of another without license, 
invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, 
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other 
                                                          
380. FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1), (10). 
381. See id. 
382. Arp v. Waterway E. Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2017). 
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Arp, 217 So. 3d at 119, 122. 
388. Id. at 120. 
389. Id. at 120–21 (alteration in original); see also Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 
691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (explaining the difference between licensees by invitation and uninvited 
licensee). 
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than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity.”390  To the trespasser and uninvited 
licensee, the court concluded, “[t]he only duty a [property owner] owes . . . is 
‘to avoid willful or wanton harm to him and, upon discovery of his presence, 
to warn him of any known dangers which would not be open to his ordinary 
observation.’”391  The facts did not show that Waterway breached its duty to 
Mrs. Arp, who “was, at best, an uninvited licensee.”392 
3. Slip and Fall:  No Notice 
Ms. Wilson-Greene (“Plaintiff”) brought a negligence action related 
to a fall that occurred in a City of Miami owned building.
393
  The 
maintenance contract for the building was between the City of Miami and 
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc.
394
  Plaintiff testified that she had business 
on the second floor, which Plaintiff said took more than fifteen minutes, and 
that she used the elevator from the second floor to return to the lobby.
395
  Her 
testimony was to the effect that when she stepped off the elevator, she 
slipped on a green substance, fell, hit her head, lost consciousness, and when 
she became conscious again, she had a green substance on her body that was 
not hot.
396
  Plaintiff testified that “[s]he did not see any substance on the 
floor before she entered the elevator” in the same group of elevators to go up 
to the second floor.
397
  Plaintiff lost on a motion for summary judgment and 
she appealed.
398
  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that 
the language of the contract between the defendants, the City of Miami and 
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc., “did not create a contractual duty on Vista 
[Maintenance Services, Inc. to] constantly . . . patrol the building” for 
dangerous conditions.
399
  Neither the City of Miami nor Vista Maintenance 
Services, Inc. had actual notice of the dangerous condition, and a permissible 
inference of constructive notice was not supported by the facts.
400
  The 
                                                          
390. Arp, 217 So. 3d at 121 (quoting Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 
1972)). 
391. Id. at 120 (quoting Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980)). 
392. Id. at 121–22. 
393. Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. 
398. Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1273. 
399. Id. at 1274. 
400. Id. at 1275. 
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district court distinguished melting substances from hot substances, which 
“requires a jury to impermissibly stack inferences,”401 stating: 
We conclude that where melting substances are involved, 
there is no need to infer the substance was previously frozen.  
Logic tells us that is a given.  In the instant case, the jury first 
would need to infer that the substance was hot prior to spilling on 
the floor and infer from this that it was on the floor for a sufficient 
amount of time for it to have cooled.
402
 
The district court held that “[t]he mere presence of soup which is 
‘not hot’ on the floor is not enough to establish constructive notice.”403  Nor 
was there actual notice.
404
  The court noted that the contract did not have the 
type of language that would have required a heightened duty of care on the 
part of Vista Management Services, Inc.
405
 
D. UCC and Other Debtor-Creditor Disputes 
1. Perfected Security Interest 
In Beach Community Bank v. Disposal Services, LLC,
406
 Beach 
Community Bank (“Creditor”) held a perfected security interest under the 
Uniform Commercial Code in certain containers that secured a debt owed to 
Creditor by Solid Waste Haulers (“Debtor”).407  Debtor sold the containers to 
Disposal Services, LLC (“Transferee”), but Debtor did not apply the sales 
proceeds to its debt to Creditor.
408
  Debtor eventually defaulted on payments 
to Creditor, and Creditor then made written demand of Transferee that it pay 
Debtor’s debt in full or turn over the containers to Creditor.409  Transferee 
did neither, and Creditor sued Transferee alleging conversion of the 
containers.
410
  On motion by Transferee, the trial court entered an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Transferee, opining that Creditor 
could not sue for conversion because the remedy of replevin was still 
available to it.
411
  Creditor appealed and the First District Court of Appeal 
                                                          
401. Id. at 1276. 
402. Id. 
403. Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1275. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. at 1274. 
406. 199 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
407. Id. at 1133. 
408. Id. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. at 1133–34. 
411. Beach Cmty. Bank, 199 So. 3d at 1134. 
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reversed.
412
  Creditor had alleged in its complaint all of the elements 
necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion.
413
  “When an 
unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured party has numerous 
cumulative remedies at its disposal; it is not forced to elect a single 
remedy.”414 
2. Assignment of Accounts Receivable 
The Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) contracted with 
Arbor One, Inc. (“Assignor”) for certain work to be done.415  Assignor sold 
to United Capital Funding Corp. (“Assignee”) Assignor’s accounts 
receivable from the DOT.
416
  Assignee, pursuant to section 679.4061 of the 
Florida Statutes, notified the DOT in writing, of the assignment and the 
amount of the receivables and advised the DOT to make contract payments 
due to Assignee—not to Assignor.417  The DOT continued to pay 
Assignor.
418
  Assignee sued the DOT and obtained a summary judgment 
declaring the DOT to be legally obligated to Assignee for payment of the 
Arbor One accounts receivable.
419
  The Second District Court of Appeal 
affirmed, concluding that the DOT was an account debtor like any other 
subject to the above cited statute.
420
  The court also determined that the DOT 
did not come within the so-called transfer exception of sections 679.1091 to 
679.4061(1).
421
  Finally, the Second District ruled that the DOT’s claim of 
sovereign immunity was barred by section 337.19(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.
422
 
3. Homestead Sales Proceeds 
JBK Associates, Inc. v. Sill Bros., Inc.
423
 involved a judgment 
creditor’s claim to the proceeds of the sale of the judgment debtor’s 
                                                          
412. Id. at 1135. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. Dep’t of Transp. v. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d 126, 128 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
416. Id. 
417. Id. at 128–29; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.4061 (2012). 
418. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 129. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. at 130, 136. 
421. Id. at 133, 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.1091, .4061(1). 
422. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 
337.19(1) (2012). 
423. 191 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2016). 
43
Landau: 2016-2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
44 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
homestead.
424
  Creditor obtained a judgment against debtor in 2010.
425
  In 
2013, due to Debtor’s divorce, the marital homestead was sold and Debtor’s 
portion of the proceeds was deposited in a [Florida] Homestead Account 
(“Account”) at Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC (“Garnishee”).426  The account 
was subdivided into a cash portion and two securities portions.
427
  The 
account was kept separate from Debtor’s other assets.428  In 2014, Creditor 
served writs of garnishment on Garnishee in an effort to apply the assets of 
the account toward satisfaction of its judgment.
429
  In the trial court, Debtor 
successfully moved to have the writs dissolved.
430
  The trial court’s order 
was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the strength of the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision431 in Orange Brevard Plumbing & 
Heating Co. v. La Croix.
432
  The Fourth District’s decision was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Florida.
433
  The Supreme Court reiterated the basic 
principle that proceeds from the sale of one’s Florida homestead continues to 
enjoy protection from the claims of most creditors and provided: 
(1) [T]here must be a good faith intention, prior to and at the time 
of the sale, to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a 
reasonable time; (2) [t]he funds must not be commingled with 
other monies; (3) [t]he proceeds must be kept separate and apart 
and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home.
434
 
The Court found that Debtor had kept faith with the requirements of 
Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating.
435
 
424. Id. at 880. 
425. Id. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. 
428. JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 880. 
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